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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-Entrapment-Will Defendant's Prior Intent Preclude the
Defense? United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).

The defendant with the aid of several other persons,
embarked upon a scheme to print over one million dollars in
counterfeit twenty dollar bills. Prior to any involvement by
the government, the defendant on his own purchased rag
paper and ink of the type and color necessary to duplicate
paper currency and made inquiries about a printer. At some
point in the scheme the Secret Service discovered the plan,
infiltrated the ring, and exercised substantial control over
its operations. The agents' activities included supervising the
printing of the counterfeit bills as well as arranging for
their delivery to the defendant. Upon delivery by an agent
posing as a printer, the defendant was arrested and subsequently convicted for unlawful possession and conspiracy to
produce and pass counterfeit obligations. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the defense of entrapment may
lie, even though the defendant has set the initial plan in
motion, if a complicated criminal scheme is involved and the
government itself has performed essential parts of the criminal offense that might not otherwise have been committed.'
The purpose of this note will be to test this, and other recent
holdings, against the traditional requirements of the entrapment defense.
INTRODUCTION:

THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY TESTS

It is not surprising that the subject of entrapment should be in confusion both as to the results of
the cases and the grounds on which they are decided.
In truth there seems to me no rational basis for the
doctrine. Its origin is to be found in the natural
feeling, shared by judges, that a person should not
be made the victim of what Mr. Justice Holmes called
... "dirty business." 2
1. United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
2. Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapmentin the FederalCourts, 90 U. PA. L. REV.

245, 263 (1942).
Copyright@ 1973 by the University of Wyoming
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The two major Supreme Court cases establishing the socalled "majority" and "minority" tests for entrapment'
are Sorrells v. United States' and Sherman v. United States.5
The Court in Sherman propounded the following as the basic
rationale' of the defense:
The function of law enforcement is the prevention of
crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly,
that function does not include the manufacturing of
crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth and
strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the
police officer. However, "A different question is
presented when the criminal design originates with
the officials of the Government, and they implant in
the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission
in order that they may prosecute." . . . Congress
could not have intended that its statutes were to be
enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.'
This general statement gives rise to the following elements
of the "majority" test: first, it is a two part test requiring the
defendant to show not only that the original criminal design
originated with the government officials, but also that he
had no predisposition to commit the offense ;' second, the
theoretical basis of the defense is that there is an implied
exception in the crlninal statute in that the legislature could
not have intended an act to be a crime which is the result of
the "creative activity" of the government ;9 third, there is no
entrapment if the government merely affords the opportunity
3. For a discussion of the historical development of the defense of entrapment and an analysis of these traditional tests see Williams, The Defense
of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution,28 FORDHAM
L. REv. 399 (1959); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 871 (1963) ; 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333 (1960).

4. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
5. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
6. While purportedly not accepting either the "majority" or the "minority"
test, the Court again accepted this rationale in Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963), the latest Supreme Court decision on entrapment.
7. Supra note 5, at 372.
8.
Under the rule of the majority here [Sorrelle] there are two principle considerations: police misconduct on the one hand, and the
character of the defendant on the other. Both police misconduct
and the initial innocence of the defendant must be proved in order
to establish the defense of entrapment.
Williams, supra note 3, at 410.
9. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 369 (1972). See Mikell, supra note 2. The
author there critically analyzed the underlying rationale of the "majority"
and "minority" tests and rejected both as illogical.
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for the commission of the offense ; o and finally, evidence of
the defendant's prior conduct (including prior convictions of
like crimes) is admissable to prove his predisposition."
The concurring judges in both Sorrells and Sherman were
unable to accept two elements of the majority's test: the
rationale of the "implied exception" and the attention given
to the "predisposition" of the defendant. Their theory of
the defense began from a different premise and in effect
shifted the focus from the character of the governmental
activity vis-a-vis the defendant's predisposition to a consideration of the governmental activity standing alone. The following statements by Justice Roberts (concurring in Sorrells) and
Justice Frankfurter (concurring in Sherman) are illustrative
of their approach.
The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental rule
of public policy. The protection of its own function
and the preservation of the purity of its own temple
belongs only to the court. It is the province of the
court and of the court alone to protect itself and the
government from such prostitution of the criminal
law. The violation of the principles of justice by the
entrapment of the unwary into crime should be dealt
with by the court no matter by whom or at what
stage of the proceedings the facts are brought to
its attention. 2
Furthermore, a test that looks to the character and
predisposition of the defendant rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason
for the defense of entrapment. No matter what the
defendant's past record and present inclinations to
criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in
the estimation of society, certain police conduct to
ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated
by an advanced society."
This test shifts attention from the record and predisposition of the particular defendant to the conduct
of the police and the likelihood, objectively con10. Sorrells v. United States, supra note 4, at 441.
11. Sorrells v. United States, supra note 4, at 451. See also
LAW § 9, at 1036 (2d ed. 1969).
12. Sorrells v. United States, supra note 4, at 457.
13. Sherman v. United States, supra note 6, at 382-83.
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sidered, that it would entrap only those ready and
willing to commit the crime. 4
As to the rationale of the defense:
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt
be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the
Government to bring about conviction cannot be
countenanced."5
While it is apparent from the above that the "minority"
test (as the test set forth in the concurring opinions in Sorrells
and Sherman is commonly called) does focus attention upon
the activity of the government, it is important to note, for
purposes of the present discussion, that the concurring
opinions in neither case challenged the fact that "original
intent" in the mind of the government official is a prerequisite
to the defense of entrapment. 6 This element was treated, in
fact, as such a basic presupposition that Frankfurter and
Roberts hardly felt it was worth consideration. 7 What the
concurring Justices in both cases objected to in the majority's
test was not the "intent" restriction on the defense, but
rather the requirement of an "innocent" defendant who had
no "predisposition" to commit the offense.
This distinction between intent and predisposition is made
clear upon a careful reading of Frankfurter's opinion in
Sherman, but has become the source of confusion when his
comments have been taken out of context. It is important
to note the full development of Frankfurter's criticism of the
majority's approach:
14. Id. at 384.
15. Id. at 380.
16. Sorrells v. United States, supra note 4, at 454 (Roberts concurring) : "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and
his procurement of its commission by one who would not otherwise have
perpetrated it except for the persuasion . . . of the officer."
17. Sherman v. United States, supra note 5, at 382 (Frankfurter concurring):
"Of course in every case of this kind the intention that the particular crime
be committed originates with the police, and without their inducement the
crime would not have occurred." See also, Lafave, supra note 9, at 371
where it is stated that showing intent in the mind of the police is the first
step under either "majority" or "minority" tests. And see Sorrells v. United
States, supra note 4, at 458 (Roberts concurring): "[The defendant] has
committed the crime in question, but, by supposition, only because of instigation and inducement by a government officer."
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The crucial question . . . is whether the police

conduct revealed in the particular case falls below
standards . . . for the proper use of governmental

power. For answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask if
the intention to commit the crime originated with
the defendant [which the majority test on first glance
would apparently ask].... Of course in every case of
this kind the intention that the particular crime be
committed originates with the police....
The intention referred to, [by the majority and
attacked by the minority] therefore, must be a general intention or predisposition to commit ...crimes

of the kind solicited [and not the specific intention to
commit the particular crime in question] ....
phasis added)."s

(Em-

In other words, Frankfurter recognized that the majority's test placed two obstacles in the way of defendant's
defense of entrapment: he must show he had no prior intent
(specific intent to commit the particular offense) and no
predisposition (general "intent") to commit crimes of the
same type. It was only as to the latter obstacle that the
concurring Justices complained. It is only the latter type of
intent which is "irrelevant." The reason for their objection
is clear. Since predisposition is a factor in the defense, the
majority test allows a searching inquiry into the defendant's
prior conduct (including prior convictions) 19 and this evidence may be submitted to the jury. The danger seen by
Frankfurter is that:
The defendant must either forego the claim of entrapment or run the substantial risk that, in spite of
instructions, the jury will allow a criminal record or
bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt
of the specific offense of which he stands charged.2"
To avoid this danger, the Roberts-Frankfurter solution
was to ignore defendant's predisposition (but not his intent)
and focus upon whether the police conduct involved a substantial risk of entrapping persons other than those ready and
willing to commit the crime.
18. Sherman v. United States,- supra note 5, at 382.
19. Sorrells v. United States, supra note 4, at 451.
20. Sherman v. United States, aupra. note 5, at 382.
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Confusion has resulted in a number of recent cases because courts have failed to make the distinction between
"intent" and "predisposition," discussed above. The following two examples are illustrative.
In United States v. Tartar21 it appeared from the evidence, and from statements by the defendant's own counsel,
that the defendant on his own initiative offered to bribe a
Government agent who was auditing his tax return. The
court, allegedly adhering to the "majority" test in Shernan,
held that the jury could properly have found that the defendant was "predisposed" to offer a bribe to the agent and
upheld his conviction. The defense of entrapment in this
case clearly was not proper under the "majority" test. However, the defense should not have fallen on the grounds that
the defendant was "predisposed." Predisposition is a factor
to be considered under the "majority" test only after it is
shown that the "intent" to commit the crime originated with
the government official who then induced the defendant. In
this case it was the defendant who originally approached the
agent with the offer of the bribe. Only after this initial act
by the defendant did the agent begin to give him slight encouragement. The defense of entrapment, under the "majority" test, should have fallen here because the defendant
had the original intent to commit the crime and not because
he was "predisposed to offer a bribe."
An even clearer example of the confusion in this area is
found in People v. Moran.22 The defendant in this case had
been in possession of 20 tablets of LSD for two months prior
to his initial contact with the government agent who later
made the purchase. The defendant at first refused to deal
with the police informant, a friend and classmate of his, but
finally agreed to the sale after repeated solicitations by the

informant who told the defendant that he wanted the drugs
for a friend who needed them badly. The defendant was later
convicted of possession and sale of LSD.
21. 439 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1971).
22. 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1970).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss2/11

6

Pauli: Criminal Law - Entrapment - Will Defendant's Prior Intent Preclud

1973

CASE NOTES

The majority opinion stated as a general rule that entrapment is not established if there is evidence from which
it can be inferred that the intent to commit the particular offense originated in the mind of the defendant. Such evidence
existed, the majority concluded, in the fact that the defendant
had possessed the drugs for two months prior to the sale.
Upon this finding the jury's verdict was upheld.
Two things must be made clear at this point before the
mistake made by the majority and the even greater mistake
made by Justice Traynor in his dissent can be fully appreciated. First, the rule stated by the majority is correct. Under either the "majority" or "minority" test the defense
cannot stand if the intent to commit the particular crime
originated in the mind of the defendant rather than in the
mind of the police. Second, however, it must be pointed out
that the evidence of the defendant's possession of the drugs
for two months prior to the sale did not show intent. At the
most, this evidence merely tended to prove the defendant's
predisposition. "Intent" in the context of the entrapment
defense means intent to commit the particular offense, in this
case the sale of LSD to the agent. This must be distinguished
from the defendant's predisposition, or willingness to sell
drugs in general. Possession of the drugs for period prior
to the sale might be evidence of "predisposition", but cannot
be said to be evidence of the defendant's "intent" to sell to
the agent on this particular occasion. The defendant was not
even aware of the existence of the agent during the two months
he had the drugs in his possession.
Justice Traynor's first mistake in his dissenting opinion
was accepting the majority's reasoning as being correct. The
Chief Justice was aware that under the "minority" type test
adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Benford," the evidence relied on by the majority in Moran should
have been ignored. He recognized the likelihood of prejudice
if such evidence were to be shown to the jury. He also recognized the general theory of the "minority" test that the court
should be basically concerned with the degree of impermis23. 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959).
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sible police conduct involved. However, Justice Traynor
attempted to reach this result within the boundaries and
definitions established by the majority opinion.
Instead of distinguishing between intent and predisposition as the true "minority" test does, the Chief Justice tried
to reason his way to the same result working solely with the
"intent" of the defendant. He first narrowly summarized
the "majority" test as:
According to its [majority in Sorrells and Sherman]
test, if the intent to commit the offense originated in
the accused's mind, entrapment cannot be established; if the intent originated in the mind of a law
enforcement officer the defense is established.24
This statement of the test is only partly correct. It tends
to make the "majority" test a pure "origin of intent" test.
While it is true that, under the "majority" test, the defense
can never stand where the intent is found to have originated
in the mind of the defendant, it is not true that the defense
is established if the intent is found to have originated in the
mind of the official. As to the latter situation, the defense
is established only if it is shown in addition that there was
inducement by the official and the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.
Justice Traynor went on to chastise the majority in the
Moran case for deviating from the "minority" type test
adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Benford.2 5 Had the Chief Justice recognized the distinction between "predisposition" and "intent", his criticism could
simply have stated:
The majority's statement of the rule is correct under
either the "majority" or "minority" test since under either the defense is precluded if the intent
originated in the mind of the defendant. However,
the "minority" type test adopted in California by
Benf ord ignores evidence of the defendant's predisposition since this type of evidence is likely to be prejudicial to the jury. In this case the evidence of the
defendant's possession of the drugs merely showed
24. People v. Moran, supra note 22, at 767.
25. People v. Benford, supra note 23.
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"predisposition" and a conviction based upon this
evidence cannot stand.
However, since the Chief Justice had accepted the finding by
the majority that the evidence of possession showed "intent"
to commit the crime he could logically ignore this evidence only
by concluding: first, that the "majority" test was purely an
"origin of the intent" test (as noted above), and second, that
the minority in Sorrells and Sherman had reacted to this
narrow test of the majority by completely ignoring "intent"
and focusing solely on the methods used by the police. He
supported this content on the statement by Frankfurter
in Sherman that " 'it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the 'intention' to commit the crime originated with the defendant
or government officers ..., ,"

Out of context this quotation

appears to say that the prior intention of the defendant to
commit the crime is irrelevant. In context (as discussed in
the introduction of this note) it is clear that Justice Frankfurter actually meant that the defendant's "predisposition"
was irrelevant.
Justice Traynor correctly found that under the "minority" type test as established by Benford the evidence in the
Moran conviction should have been excluded. His reasoning,
however, did not follow the true "minority" test. He had
fallen into the trap of failing to distinguish between "intent"
and "predisposition." Under the true "minority" test, "intent" of the defendant is always relevant. Just as under the
"majority" test, its absence is a prerequisite to the defense.
%

The problems discussed above take a confusing twist
when the court, as in the principle case of McGrath, is faced
with the dilemma of a defendant who clearly had the original
intent to commit the crime, but at the same time there existed
activity by the Government which was of the type condemned
by both the "majority" and "minority" tests.
In McGrath, the agents' activity in effectively taking
control of the printing of the counterfeit money and arranging
the time and place of the delivery went well beyond merely
providing an opportunity for the commission of the crime.
26. People v. Moran, supra note 22, at 768.
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Were it not for the prior intent of the defendant, the defense
would certainly have been established under the "minority"
test, which focuses primarily on the degree of involvement
by the police and not upon the predisposition of the defendant. On the other hand, since there was some evidence of
a predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit the
offense," it is doubtful whether the defense would lie under
the "majority" test even if prior intent were not present.
The court in McGrath analogized the factual situation
there with cases where a government agent supplies contraband to the defendant and then arrests him for selling it back
to the agent.
The court quoted the following from the case of People
v. Strong:"s
"While we are sympathetic to the problems of enforcement agencies in controlling the narcotics traffic, and their use of informers to that end, we cannot
condone the action of one acting for the government
in supplying the very narcotics that gave rise to the
alleged offense. We know of no conviction for sale
of narcotics that has been sustained when the narcotics sold were supplied by an agent of the government. This is more than mere inducement. In reality
the government is supplying the sine qua non of the
offense. "2 9
While Strong does support that part of the court's holding that the government was guilty of performing essential
parts of the criminal offense itself, the cases can be distinguished. The majority in Strong clearly accepted the traditional definition of entrapment as the " 'conception and
planning of a offense by a officer, and his procurement of
its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the . . . persuasion . . . of the officer.' 8 Entrapment was allowed to stand in People v. Strong not because
the court ignored the "intent" question but rather because
the court felt that the unrebutted evidence of the defendant
27. The court intimated the defendant may have had previous convictions of
counterfeiting. United States v. McGrath, supra note 1, at 1029.
2d 325, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961).
28. 21 Ill.
29. United States v. McGrath, supra note 1, at 1031,
30. People v. Strong, supra note 28, at 767,
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that the drugs were supplied by an agent of the government
indicated that he was induced to perform the unlawful act
and was not apprehended "in the execution of a criminal act
of his own conception." 3 1 There is nothing in People v.
Strong to indicate the court would have allowed the entrapment defense to stand had it been shown that the original
intent was the defendant's The failure of the government
to deny the defendant's testimony gave rise to an inference
(of intent) against the state. Far from being irrelevant, "intent" was the key factor in this decision.
The McGrath decision finds its strongest support in
United States v. Chisum 2 In this case the defendant contacted a known counterfeiter seeking to buy counterfeit
money. The defendant was put in contact with a Government agent who sold him counterfeit bills and then arrested
him for receiving counterfeit bills with the intent to pass them
as genuine. The court there noted that the intent originated
with the defendant:
If the defense of entrapment must be confined
solely to the issue of intent, then the defendant's
motion must fail. It is clear that the facts as presented here reveal that the intent to commit the crime
arose solely in the mind of the defendant without inducement by the government. 3
Despite the existence of this intent, the Chisum court
held that the defense of entrapment would still stand. It
drew support for this decision from People v. Strong and
from the concurring opinion of Frankfurter in Sherman. The
court quotes, out of context, that part of Frankfurter's opinion which reads, "'[I]t is wholly irrelevant to ask if the
'intention' to commit the crime originated with the defendant or governmental officers. . . .' "" As discussed in the
introduction, however, it is evident that Frankfurter was
really saying that "predisposition" is irrelevant and not "intent" to commit the particular act. 5 It is clear that Chisum
presents an unwarranted expansion of the defense of entrap31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

People v. Strong, supra note 28, at 767.
312 F. Supp. 1307 (D.C. Cal. 1970).
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1311.
See text supra p. 648.
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ment under either the "majority" or "minority" tests which
both recognize lack of defendants' intent as a prerequisite.
This court too fell into the trap of failing to distinguish between "predisposition" and "intent".
As in Chisum, the court in McGrath found support in the
concurring opinions in Sorrells and Sherman. The court here
did not make the same mistake the Chisum court did, however. It recognized that the "minority" test was objecting
to the attention paid the defendant's "predisposition" by the
"majority" test. It recognized that this is what the "minority" test found "irrelevant." It recognized that the "minority" test focused upo the police behavior. However, the
court failed to recognize that what the defendant had here was
"intent" and not a mere "predisposition". It failed to recognize that, while under the "minority" test predisposition
can be ignored, "intent" can never be "exacerbated by official intervention.' ' Once again this indicates a failure to
distinguish between "intent" and "predisposition".
A more logical approach to the dilemma was taken in

Greene v. United States."7 In this case a Government agent
posing as a "syndicate" man had, through previous activities
with the defendants, succeeded in setting up their arrest in
1963 for selling bootleg whiskey. Once released from custody
the rather naive defendants re-contacted the agent, whom
they still believed to be a "syndicate" man, and informed him
they were going back into the bootlegging business. Their
subsequent arrest in 1966 was overturned, but not on the
basis of entrapment. Rather the court reversed simply on the
grounds that the Government had become too involved."
The court stated:
Entrapment is shown where government agents go
beyond the mere affording of opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense and exert persuasion or pressure of one kind or another which induces the commission of a crime by one who had no
predisposition to do so. . . . (Citations omitted)
36. United States v. McGrath, supra note 1, at 1030.
37. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
38. E.g., the agent had offered to provide a still and equipment, had provided
2,000 pounds of sugar, had continuously put pressure on the defendants, and
was their only customer.
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[The defendant] had a predisposition [really a
intent] to manufacture and sell bootleg whiskey from
the time [the agents] first contact with them, and
the usual entrapment defense is therefore not available.
However, the facts presented by this unique
record do reveal circumstances which, in combination, require reversal of these convictions....
We do not believe the Government may involve
itself so directly and continuously over such a long
period of time in the creation and maintenance of
criminal operations, and yet prosecute its collaborators ....
[A] certain amount of stealth and strategy
"are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police
officer." But, although this is not an entrapment
case, when the Government permits itself to become
enmeshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end,
to the extent which appears here, the same underlying
objections which render entrapment repugnant to
American criminal justice are operative."
If it is accepted that the defense of entrapment, under
either the "majority" or "minority" tests, cannot be established where the defendant originally formulated the intent,
the approach taken in Greene seems logical.41
Under the rationale in Greene, the conviction of McGrath
could have been reversed without attempting to tie the decision to the defense of entrapment. McGrath was clearly a case
where the government had become completely enmeshed in
the criminal activity from beginning to end.
CoNCLUSION
Since this article was first sent to the printer, the United
States Supreme Court has again addressed itself to the prob39. Supra note 37, at 786.
40. Supra note 37, at 787. The dissent agreed that this was not an entrapment case, but disagreed that it presented a special case justifying reversal.
Entrapment . . . is repugnant not because of the Government has,
through successful infiltration of a conspiracy, become an active
participant in a criminal enterprise; it is repugnant because the
Government has acted unworthily or unfairly in inducing commission of the crime. I do not regard it as unworthy or unfair to
play a demanding cover role or to take advantage of the eagerness
and naivete of suspects.
Id. at 788.
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lems involved in the entrapment defense. In United States v.
Russell,4 1 the Court in a 5 to 4 decision reversed the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and affirmed the conviction of a
defendant despite the alleged "intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise" upon which
the appellate court, following Ckisum and Greene, had relied
in reversing the conviction.
This decision, which might have served more properly as
the focal point of this discussion had it been handed down
earlier, would seem to be supportive of the basic contentions
set forth herein.
The basic propositions of this note, simply stated, are
these: that there is a basic distinction between "intent" and
"predisposition" as the terms are applied to entrapment; that
under either the "majority" or "minority" test, origin of
specific intent in the mind of the government officer is always
a prerequisite to the defense; and finally; that certain courts,
e.g., McGrath have unwarrantedly extended the so-called
"minority" test to allow the "intent" as well as the "predisposition" of the defendent to be ignored when the degree of
governmental involvement has reached a prohibitive point.
In Russell, a Government agent supplied chemical,
phenyl-2-propanone
(essential in the manufacture of
"speed") to the defendant, who, even before this transaction,
was actively engaged in manufacturing the illicit drug. The
finished product was purchased by the agent and the defendant was convicted for its manufacture.
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Rehnquist
basically reaffirmed the "majority" test set out in Sorrells
and Sherman and rejected the defendant's contention that
only the degree of police involvement should be considered
in determining whether entrapment was established as a
matter of law. While the court spoke generally in terms of
this defendant being "predisposed" to commit the crime, it
is apparent that what was actually being referred to was the
fact that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the
crime and that this factor could not be ignored.
41.

United States v. Russell,
1973) (No. 71-1585).

U.S -.-.-----41 U.S.L.W. 4538 (U.S. Apr. 24,

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss2/11

14

Pauli: Criminal Law - Entrapment - Will Defendant's Prior Intent Preclud

1973

CASE NOTES

659

The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a continuing,
though illegal, business enterprise.
42
[It does not] seem particularly desirable for the
law to grant complete immunity from prosecution to
one who himself planned to commit the crime. ..
. . . It is only when the government's deception
actually implants the criminal design in the mind of
the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes
into play.4 4 (Emphasis added).
Entrapment could not be claimed here because the defendant
had failed to meet the first step under either the "majority"
or "minority" tests i.e., that the "intent" to commit the
crime did not originate with the defendant. Viewing the
case in this manner, it would not seem to present a direct rejection of the true "minority test" nor any new "hard-line"
by the Court. The opinion tends, rather, to undercut decisions
such as McGrath which proposed to look solely at the degree
of police involvement ignoring both "intent" and "predisposition," decisions which offend both traditional tests of
entrapment. Finally, it should be noted that the Court did
not entirely rule out all possibility of reversal of a conviction
based solely upon the degree of police involvement without
regard to entrapment, as suggested by Greene, if "the conduct
of law-enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking
judicial process to obtain a conviction." 5 However, the
court noted that some degree of infiltration and participation
in the criminal activity is permissable. Whatever the degree
of involvement necessary to demand reversal, it was not met
by the situation in Russell. Presumably it would not be met
by the circumstances in McGrath either.
It would appear that the "minorty" test of entrapment
is growing in acceptance 6 and is perhaps the better view if
42. Id. at 4540.
43. Id. at 4541.
44. Id. at 4542.
45. Id. at 4540.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13; Magness, The Defense of Entrapment-Definitiona, Bases and Procedure, 3 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 117 (1971); 1971 UTAH
L. REV. 266 (1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW 40.05 (McKinney 1967).
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the purpose is to deter reprehensible police practices."' The
Russell decision on a close reading would not seem to preclude
its future development and acceptance, especially since the
court has held that entrapment is not a constitutional defense. 8 However, expansion of the defense beyond this test
to situations where the original intent arose in the mind of the
defendant appear unlikely in view of Russell. The defendant's prior intent will almost assuredly preclude the defense.
DAN J.

PAULI

47. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 48 (1972).
48. United States v. Russell, supra note 41, at 4541.
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